The argument of Sri A.K. Gaur, learned counsel for the petitioners, that the contempt proceedings are not maintainable is, therefore, without any substance on the facts as disclosed and discussed hereinabove in the present case. The judgment in the case of T. Sudhakar Prasad (supra), as relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, particularly paragraph no. 16, in no way comes to the aid of the petitioners so as to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is no doubt true that the Tribunal is amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court, but at the same time, it is not necessary for this Court to interfere with the proceedings unless it is established that the proceedings are coram non judice. In the instant case, there is no material before us to demonstrate that the Tribunal cannot or could not have issued a notice to the officials of the petitioners to answer the contempt notice. We may again put on record that the manner in which this writ petition has been framed in the official capacity of the officers appears to be only to save them from liabilities which they ought to incur and is a saving device for reasons best known to them. The aggrieved persons would be the officials who had been impleaded by name in the Contempt Application and not the officers in their official capacity. There is yet another aspect, namely that against the punishment by the Tribunal upon conviction, an appeal lies directly to the Supreme Court. In such circumstances, to entertain a writ petition would not be in conformity with the scheme of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, read with Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, unless the proceedings are patently without jurisdiction or are otherwise ultra vires the Constitution or the provisions of any Act. A writ petition may lie against an order of the Tribunal refusing to issue notices for contempt, as held by the Apex Court in the case of Sujitendra Nath Singh Roy vs. State of West Bengal and others, (2015) 12 SCC 514. The preliminary objection raised by respondent no. 1, as incorporated in the interim order dated 16th December, 2010, had not been answered in the said order, nor have we been able to find any argument on behalf of the petitioners that may dislodge the preliminary objection raised by the respondent. Further, as observed hereinabove, once the Tribunal itself had issued directions on 22.01.2008 for ensuring compliance with its orders in the contempt jurisdiction and left it open to respondent no. 1 to file a fresh Contempt Application in the event of non-compliance (vide judgment dated 22nd January, 2008), we see no reason, over and above the reasons indicated hereinabove, as to why respondent no. 1 could not have filed the Contempt Application when he alleges the order dated 24th February, 2010 to be a contemptuous order, which is yet to be examined in the proceedings before the Tribunal. The argument of Sri A.K. Gaur, learned counsel for the petitioners, that the contempt proceedings are not maintainable is, therefore, without any substance on the facts as disclosed and discussed hereinabove in the present case. The judgment in the case of T. Sudhakar Prasad (supra), as relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, particularly paragraph no. 16, in no way comes to the aid of the petitioners so as to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is no doubt true that the Tribunal is amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court, but at the same time, it is not necessary for this Court to interfere with the proceedings unless it is established that the proceedings are coram non judice. In the instant case, there is no material before us to demonstrate that the Tribunal cannot or could not have issued a notice to the officials of the petitioners to answer the contempt notice. We may again put on record that the manner in which this writ petition has been framed in the official capacity of the officers appears to be only to save them from liabilities which they ought to incur and is a saving device for reasons best known to them. The aggrieved persons would be the officials who had been impleaded by name in the Contempt Application and not the officers in their official capacity. There is yet another aspect, namely that against the punishment by the Tribunal upon conviction, an appeal lies directly to the Supreme Court. In such circumstances, to entertain a writ petition would not be in conformity with the scheme of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, read with Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, unless the proceedings are patently without jurisdiction or are otherwise ultra vires the Constitution or the provisions of any Act. A writ petition may lie against an order of the Tribunal refusing to issue notices for contempt, as held by the Apex Court in the case of Sujitendra Nath Singh Roy vs. State of West Bengal and others, (2015) 12 SCC 514. The preliminary objection raised by respondent no. 1, as incorporated in the interim order dated 16th December, 2010, had not been answered in the said order, nor have we been able to find any argument on behalf of the petitioners that may dislodge the preliminary objection raised by the respondent. Further, as observed hereinabove, once the Tribunal itself had issued directions on 22.01.2008 for ensuring compliance with its orders in the contempt jurisdiction and left it open to respondent no. 1 to file a fresh Contempt Application in the event of non-compliance (vide judgment dated 22nd January, 2008), we see no reason, over and above the reasons indicated hereinabove, as to why respondent no. 1 could not have filed the Contempt Application when he alleges the order dated 24th February, 2010 to be a contemptuous order, which is yet to be examined in the proceedings before the Tribunal. Submit